Prior to 1949, there was a seemingly reasonable hope that the world would be able to experience a time of protracted peace. To be sure, the Cold War tensions between the USSR and the western Allies were real and detectable, but America’s monopoly on atomic weapons was assumed to be the trump card which would prevent massive Soviet aggression.
Anticipating peace, the U.S. had begun dismantling its military.
The addition of China to the communist bloc also strengthened the Soviet position. Sino-Soviet relations would remain strong for several years after 1949. In the mid-1950s, those relations would cool.
It was not obvious that the Soviet Socialists were using their spy network inside the U.S. to gain nuclear weapons technology. When they conducted a weapons test in August 1949, exploading an atomic bomb, and when U.S. intelligence agencies confirmed this event was confirmed in September 1949, the global balance of power shifted. The USSR was emboldened, and used ruthless military power to squash uprisings of freedom fighters in Berlin in June 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Prague in 1968.
In light of these events, President Truman requested that the National Security Council (NSC) write a comprehensive document, detailing the global military situation. The report, titled NSC-68, analyzed the state of the world, projected possible future scenarios, and advised steps which the U.S. could take in order to be ready for those scenarios. A small number of officials within the U.S. government read the text, written jointly by members of the Department of State and the Department of Defense; the text disturbed the readers: their hopes for a few quiet and peaceful years were dashed.
Instead of dismantling its military, circumstances forced the U.S. to build up its military.
Based on NSC-68, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) developed a scenario called Joint Outline War Plan Reaper. This was in essence a plan for World War III, and it would go into effect if and when the Soviets attacked. The consensus among the military leaders was that the Soviets would probably attack in Europe. The war in Korea was considered to be a “secondary” theater, as historian William Donnelly writes:
In September 1950, the JCS made their recommendations for a military buildup based on NSC 68. The active Army would expand from ten to eighteen divisions by Fiscal Year 1952, with its active duty personnel strength increasing from 593,526 to 1,567,000. With the end of the Korean War expected in 1951, the active duty personnel strength would fall to 1,355,000 by Fiscal Year 1954, but the number of active divisions would remain at eighteen so that the Army could meet the demands of Joint Outline War Plan Reaper.
Although acknowledging the importance of the Pacific Rim, the plan anticipated a major Soviet offensive, crossing what was then the border between East Germany and West Germany. NATO and U.S. forces calculated that the Soviets would have the advantage in the first few days of the war, so the strategy was to let the USSR extend itself as far as the Rhine (Rhein). At that point, the western powers would have organized a defensive line. The Soviet would have spent their initial energy and would face longer supply lines across unfamiliar territory.
Like all war plans, Reaper was a collection of hypotheticals, as historian William Donnelly explains:
The Joint Outline War Plan was the JCS plan for World War III with the Soviet Union, and Reaper was the first version of the plan prepared in light of NSC 68’s recommendations. Reaper called for ten Army divisions stationed in the Zone of the Interior (ZI — the contemporary term for the continental United States), four in Japan, and four in Europe at the start of the war. Like previous Joint Outline War Plans, Reaper foresaw that the initial Soviet advantage in ground forces meant that the Air Force and the Navy would play the dominant roles in early operations. The ten Army divisions and their supporting units in the ZI would form the General Reserve, portions of which could be deployed overseas early in the war, but whose most important function would be to serve as the cadre for a massive expansion of the Army. The four divisions in Japan would defend it from a Soviet invasion while the four divisions in Europe, along with their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), would conduct a delaying operation that, in conjunction with air attacks, would halt the Soviet Army along the Rhine. The U.S. Army, drawing on the resources made available by a World War II-type national mobilization, would expand and then launch a second crusade in Europe, ending the war after four years with a Soviet surrender and a force of eighty divisions.
The implications of War Plan Reaper and the assumptions and attitudes which shaped it were these: The Korean conflict would receive limited resources, and the U.S. would need to engage in substantial defense spending and a military buildup.
Unlike WW2, when the combat operations of the military held a high priority, the Korean conflict would be supplied, manned, and funded around preparations for a speculative war plan. The military units in Korea, where actual fighting was happening in real time, received less funding, because resources were being diverted to a buildup in Europe and in the continental United States.
Not only did supply shortages and a “manpower dilemma” (Donnelly’s phrase) impact the field effectiveness of the U.S. Army in Korea, but morale also understandably suffered. Many of the soldiers in Korea were conscripts who stayed no longer than they were required to do so, while the army sent more experienced soldiers and officers to Europe.
Morale deteriorated further when it became clear that the goal for the NATO and United Nations (UN) coalition, including the United States, was an armistice or ceasefire, not a victory.
Budgetary considerations had a major influence on both the strategies and the tactics of the coalition supporting South Korea in war.
